But WHY is China Only
a Partial Power?
China Goes Global: The Partial Power, by David
Shambaugh, is an attempt to defuse some of the mounting paranoia regarding
China’s rise. The premise revolves around the fact that although China is a
large growing nation with ties all over the world, those ties are not very
strong and they are not deeply connected to anyone. China is a country without
traditional allies, and it continuously shoots itself in the foot attempting to
buy friends. Though Shambaugh does an admirable job detailing China’s strengths
and weaknesses, his argument does have a few flaws, and he fails to give a
satisfying answer as to why China is where it is globally.
Shambaugh first argues that even being an authoritative
regime with top down decisionmaking, China ironically suffers from having
multiple wildly varying narratives on what direction the country should be
taking in foreign affairs. These hit both extremes, from hypernationalists all
the way liberal institutionalists. The influence of these competing voices
makes China’s foreign policy disjointed, as the international trust and respect
that China is trying to build with the one hand is seriously harmed by the
rhetoric from the other. This is a common theme that recurs throughout the
book.
Each substantive chapter follows a similar pattern: first
Shambaugh explains China’s strengths in a given area, or otherwise what they
are attempting to build. Then he shows the limitations of those strengths. The
chapters cover most of the major foreign policy pushes: institutionalization and
diplomacy; trade and economics; cultural and soft power; and military. In each
he shows China’s global ambitions and what they have achieved so far, but then
explains what their limits are and how many of them are self-imposed.
China Goes Global is a very well cited book. Shambaugh has
extensive footnotes and has travelled the globe getting personal interviews
with everyone from Latin American universities to Russian arms suppliers. His
facts seem beyond dispute and his insightful analysis of Chinese domestic
politics speaks to his years studying and living in China. However, the vast
majority of his analysis is limited to second image Chinese domestic factors.
Being a professor of Political Science and and International Affairs, I would
think he would include some amount of structural analysis, examining China’s
place in the system of powers. Other than some very cursory mentions of a
security dilemma, Shambaugh never examines why some of China’s attempts to
globalize are met with such skepticism from a wide variety of actors, from the
US to the EU to its own Asian neighbors. Or rather, his explanations are always
from the perspective of each individual state, with no mention of anything that
could tie them all together, like relative gains considerations or the
burgeoning possibility of regional hegemony.
More damning is his dependence on a historical/cultural explanation to do much of his theory’s heavy lifting. He does do an excellent job explaining why China’s history matters to its current foreign affairs, as does its culture, but the argument is countered in his own writing. The Chinese government has systematically ignored certain periods in its history, particular from the mid 1950s until the later 1970s, the period of the Cultural Revolution. This is a significant period of the party’s history that they are very much trying to forget. Similarly, Shambaugh believes that nationalistic and institutional memory of the “Century of Shame and Humiliation” explains a lot of China’s behavior, but should a historical approach not also remember the centuries that China dominated its entire region, to say nothing of its recent subjugation and repression of other populations?
More damning is his dependence on a historical/cultural explanation to do much of his theory’s heavy lifting. He does do an excellent job explaining why China’s history matters to its current foreign affairs, as does its culture, but the argument is countered in his own writing. The Chinese government has systematically ignored certain periods in its history, particular from the mid 1950s until the later 1970s, the period of the Cultural Revolution. This is a significant period of the party’s history that they are very much trying to forget. Similarly, Shambaugh believes that nationalistic and institutional memory of the “Century of Shame and Humiliation” explains a lot of China’s behavior, but should a historical approach not also remember the centuries that China dominated its entire region, to say nothing of its recent subjugation and repression of other populations?
Chinese culture explains even less than their history.
“Culture” should be universally understood and apply equally to all its
citizens, but then what explains the variation between different foreign policy
outlooks? Though culture might be important in many cases, scholars like
Kenneth Waltz and Fareed Zakaria have attacked it for being reductionist and
amorphous. Zakaria in particular argues that a culture is complex and can
explain nearly any behavior, which of course means it explains nothing. Having
a “Confucian culture” has been used to explain everything from backwards
feudalism to industrious capitalism to cronyism and corruption.[1]
Waltz meanwhile argues that dramatically different cultures have arrived at
very similar foreign policy outcomes, suggesting that culture perhaps is not
the driver of policy and something larger is at work.[2]
Finally, Shambaugh himself quotes a number of Chinese scholars in his Soft
Power chapter that bemoan the lack of Chinese culture. They say that one
of the reasons China has such trouble attracting others is that it has nothing
to export culturally; it was all destroyed in the Cultural Revolution. In all,
Shambaugh never really defines Chinese culture consistently, but he uses it to
explain all sorts of behavior, and none of it good.
More important to the story is not Chinese culture itself, but the Chinese government’s use of their culture. This comes out most strongly in the soft power and diplomacy chapters, but is relevant in the others as well. The Chinese government stresses how unique the Chinese culture is, which plays well to a nationalistic domestic audience but pushes away foreigners. One only has to look at the American icons to see that their universality is constantly pushed. The term “McWorld” was coined for a reason. But Chinese cultural exports often have “with Chinese characteristics” attached to it: Socialism with Chinese characteristics,[3] International Relations theory with Chinese characteristics.[4] These are hard to see a non-Chinese person trying to emulate. Shambaugh does not explore this theme enough, only mentioning that Chinese propagandizing often pushes people away. Much less time is spent on why the exports that should be taking root still seem to not have the cultural appeal that they should.
More important to the story is not Chinese culture itself, but the Chinese government’s use of their culture. This comes out most strongly in the soft power and diplomacy chapters, but is relevant in the others as well. The Chinese government stresses how unique the Chinese culture is, which plays well to a nationalistic domestic audience but pushes away foreigners. One only has to look at the American icons to see that their universality is constantly pushed. The term “McWorld” was coined for a reason. But Chinese cultural exports often have “with Chinese characteristics” attached to it: Socialism with Chinese characteristics,[3] International Relations theory with Chinese characteristics.[4] These are hard to see a non-Chinese person trying to emulate. Shambaugh does not explore this theme enough, only mentioning that Chinese propagandizing often pushes people away. Much less time is spent on why the exports that should be taking root still seem to not have the cultural appeal that they should.
Shambaugh writes a number of times that the “China model” of
economics is also difficult to export, but fails to explain why. In his
economics chapter, he does an excellent job showing how integrated China is to
the global economy, and how that model, though highly productive, reminds much
of the developing world of colonialism. What is not fully explored is China’s failing
attempt at hailing the economic model itself as an alternative to western-style
capitalism. The reasons for this are obvious: China is a huge exporter of cheap
low-end goods, and an export-led growth strategy puts a state in direct
competition with them. Trying to outcompete China at its own game seems like a
non-starter. Additionally, China already runs a huge trade surplus with the
rest of the world. Another state attempting an export-led growth model might
find that the developed world is unwilling to run further trade deficits.
The security chapter is perhaps the one that lacks the most
analysis, from an International Relations perspective. Shambaugh writes the
chapter as he writes the others, explaining how China is growing and trying to
become more global, then explaining the limitations. In essence, China is
updating their military and trying to build some global capacity, but is not
there yet, or even close. But there is no attempt to answer the obvious
question of why exactly China’s military spending is growing so quickly. Do
they feel insecure, or is this an aggressive buildup? He mentions that other
states feel nervous about China’s growing offensive capabilities, and
reasonably so, but no mention of China’s motivations here. Much of China’s
buildup is focused on Taiwan and the US, but what do they have to fear from us,
and more importantly, why the focus on clearly offensive technology? A blue
water navy, long range missiles and strategic bombers, aerial refueling, these
are all tools of power projection. But where is China going to project power?
They already have a strong nuclear deterrent and the world’s largest land army,
invading their territory is nearly impossible and has been for decades, even
before the modernization push. All it seems to be doing is push
self-encirclement, where every nearby power is rushing to strengthen alliances
with the offshore balancer, the US. Shambaugh gives us no answers or analysis
here.
Overall, Shambaugh does an excellent job telling the reader what and how China is increasing its global capabilities, and how it is not. But the lack of critical analysis hurts the book and leaves the reader asking why. His only theoretical explanations are history and culture, which obviously affect everything that China does to some degree. But why is China succeeding and failing in these specific ways? Perhaps, Ironically, there is not enough history motivating China. They have only been taking part in modern foreign affairs since the 70s, and have grown into a great power very quickly. Perhaps this is simply not enough time to learn proper diplomacy and what exportable culture is like. Throughout the book, Shambaugh makes it clearly that the one thing China has going for it is money. It can spend endless amounts of cash, and it is doing so by building cultural institutes, military modernization, and buying up foreign resources and companies alike. But one cannot buy friends, nor can one buy respect. If China wants to be respected in the International system as Shambaugh claims it does, as a government and society they are going to have to grow up and learn how things are done. Money and brute force can only take you so far.
Overall, Shambaugh does an excellent job telling the reader what and how China is increasing its global capabilities, and how it is not. But the lack of critical analysis hurts the book and leaves the reader asking why. His only theoretical explanations are history and culture, which obviously affect everything that China does to some degree. But why is China succeeding and failing in these specific ways? Perhaps, Ironically, there is not enough history motivating China. They have only been taking part in modern foreign affairs since the 70s, and have grown into a great power very quickly. Perhaps this is simply not enough time to learn proper diplomacy and what exportable culture is like. Throughout the book, Shambaugh makes it clearly that the one thing China has going for it is money. It can spend endless amounts of cash, and it is doing so by building cultural institutes, military modernization, and buying up foreign resources and companies alike. But one cannot buy friends, nor can one buy respect. If China wants to be respected in the International system as Shambaugh claims it does, as a government and society they are going to have to grow up and learn how things are done. Money and brute force can only take you so far.
[1] Zakaria, F. 2003. The Future of
Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. W.W. Norton.
http://books.google.com/books?id=b4Trw_i-xE0C.
[2] Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of
International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.
[3] “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.”
2014. The 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.
Accessed February 24.
http://english.people.com.cn/90002/92169/92211/6275043.html.
[4] Xinning, Song. 2001. “Building
International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics.” Journal of
Contemporary China 10 (26): 61–74. doi:10.1080/10670560125339.
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