Drones are seen as a natural evolution of the shift in
military organization that began in World War I. Warfare has become more and
more mechanized over time, until finally now technology has progressed to the
point that, for certain operations, soldiers are not needed on the field at
all. This marks a qualitative difference from previous eras: previously, no
matter how mechanized the military might be, there was a risk to soldiers. In a
military engagement, even heavily armored troops might be killed. But with
drones, there is very little risk to military personnel: engineers and
technicians can sit in secured bases within safe territory, while pilots are
sitting in an office or facility far away from the fighting.
This marks a dramatic reduction of the costs, both material,
in terms of money and troops; and political, by not requiring leaders to
explain to the people what American troops are dying for. If war is less
costly, it is far easier to commit to a military action, and even more so to
maintain an action that is ongoing. This has dramatic impact on current
research into asymmetrical wars, which many believe boils down to a cost
calculation on the part of the strong state. If high costs can no longer be
inflicted on a strong power by a weaker power, they lose their ability to make the
stronger power quit the fighting.
However, not having soldiers physically present for a
mission is not all upside. With current technology, drones are only capable of
performing certain types of missions, in effect replacing other forms of air
power. They can effectively replace personnel in airstrikes or strategic
bombing campaigns, but like all air power they cannot control or conquer territory.
Beyond that, being the logical endpoint of mechanized military, they lack a
human ability to connect with other humans. Effective counter-insurgency
operations often boil down to an occupying soldiers’ personal connection with
civilians, thus a drone based campaign, by its very definition lacking persons,
is unlikely to succeed on that front. This raises a question: in what missions
would drones be an effective substitute for military personnel, and what are
their limitations?
In the context of asymmetric warfare, Ivan Arreguin-Toft has
examined why on occasion the strong state seems to “lose” even when a direct
power comparison says they are clearly far more powerful.[1]
For him, the outcome boils down to a difference in strategy between the weak
and strong state, and assumes, fairly reasonably, that the strong state is the
aggressor. Arreguin-Toft dichotomizes each state’s options: the strong can
choose a direct attack strategy, which means attacking the enemies armed forces
in the field and attempting to destroy their capacity to resist; or they can
choose “barbarism”, which is an attempt to destroy the defenders will to resist
by imposing extra costs on the defending population as well as the defenders
themselves. The defending military could continue to fight, but the costs of
doing so would be too high, so they give up. The defender meanwhile makes a
similar choice: direct defense, destroying the attackers capacity to attack in
the field, or a guerilla campaign, which attacks the attackers will to fight
by, again, imposing higher costs. The defender might not be able to destroy the
attackers capacity to continue, but the attacker will not want to at the costs
they are facing, and thus will quit and go home.
Arreguin-Toft finds that whenever the strategies are
mismatched, the weak state can win, but when the strategies align, the strong
state is victorious.[2] If
a weak state attempts to defend directly and loses their fighting capacity in
the field, they can no longer resist. But if they refuse to defend directly in
favor of guerilla tactics, they can impose huge costs on the attacking army,
keeping the war going far longer than it would otherwise. He also notes that
although it would make sense for the attacking army to use barbaric tactics to
defeat guerillas, it is politically costly as this strategy tends to involve
breaking the laws of war or possibly war crimes.[3]
Patricia Sullivan has a similar but different idea as to why
a strong state can lose to a weak one, also revolving around costs. Sullivan explains
that, unlike in Arreguin-Toft’s typology, the weak state cannot actually “win”
the war, in that the strong state cannot really lose.[4]
They can simply decide to stop fighting. This decision is made exclusively by
the strong state, and revolves around political leaders expectations of the
cost of the war are exceeded by the real costs. Regardless of how much damage
the weaker side takes, if they can press on until the stronger side exceeds its
cost threshold, they should be able to force a withdrawal.
The damage that can be inflicted upon the aggressor is half
of the cost equation; the other half is the military aim. Sullivan shows that
aims can fall upon a continuum from Brute Force objectives to Coercive ones.
Brute force would be the conquest of territory or expulsion of a people. It
does not require compliance of the target, sufficient force is enough. Coercive
goals, like getting someone to change a policy, requires them to comply with
your demands, force alone will not achieve the goals. Coercive goals can be far
more costly, and it is possible for a state to misestimate the costs of the
objective before committing to force. If the estimation is far enough below the
real costs, the strong power might quit before achieving their goals.[5]
Taking Arreguin-Toft and Sullivan together, we can see how a
weaker state strategy like insurgency works. Guerilla strategies only function
by imposing unacceptable costs on the attacking force, making them choose to
quit the field, never by forcing the strong state to withdraw. Drones enter
into this discussion by limiting the possible costs that can be inflicted. Each
infantryman in Afghanistan costs an estimated $850,000 a year, and there is a
political cost to deploying infantry as well, since each military death is more
meaningful than just the dollar cost of a lost investment.[6] An
F/A-18 jet costs $66 million, not including the cost of the pilot.[7] An
airstrike via Tomahawk missile costs 1.2 million per missile used.[8] A
reaper drone meanwhile costs only $16 million each and around $3,000 an hour to
operate.[9]
Obviously the risk to a pilot is zero. This is considerably less costly in both
economic and political terms. If a soldier is killed, there is political
blowback, the death must be justified, that is exactly why guerilla strategies
work. But if a drone is destroyed, and this isn’t even very likely given their
small size and high maneuverability, it’s only money. The US launches plenty of
missiles and the economic costs of each rarely enter the public discourse.
With potential costs so low, it is quite possible that this
disrupts Arreguin-Toft’s strategic interaction logic, as well as Sullivan’s
cost tolerance argument. A drone war can be run for years on the cheap, and
with a low risk of losses. Even ignoring that drones can be used for
indiscriminate “barbaric” attacks, drones can be used to directly suppress
enemy forces while also being difficult to inflict reasonable costs upon. A
nation comfortable with the reasonable per-year cost of drone warfare might
take a very long time to cross Sullivan’s cost threshold, especially if the
objective is simply long-term suppression of a rebel group or weak state,
rather than coercion. Using drones just makes it very hard to “lose” this sort
of war.
Though a drone-based war might be difficult to lose, another
group of scholars shows that not losing is not the same thing as winning. Insurgency
works by imposing costs on the attacker. A similar strategy can be used on the
defenders, called strategic bombing.[10] In
theory, it should work the same: impose costs, usually on civilians, until
there is no longer support for military action, even if the defenders could go
on. Though the mechanism is similar on both ends in theory, in practice the
situation is very different. Guerilla tactics work because the strong side can
simply give up and go home. They have not lost the war, they just failed to
win. When the defenders give up, they lose the war entirely.
Robert Pape has written extensively about the actual effectiveness
of strategic bombing as a coercive strategy, and found it wanting. In essence,
defending governments shift resources so the military is the least affected by
any indiscriminate destruction and the costs mainly fall on civilians, but
civilian populations do not seem to rise against their government as costs are
inflicted upon them.[11]
This invalidates the basic logic of strategic bombing: regardless of how it is
supposed to go in theory, in practice it seems to do nothing. He does note
however that theater bombing (using airpower as direct force against troops,
degrading the defenders short term combat capabilities instead of coercing the
civilian population at home) has become very effective in recent years.[12]
Drones might be good at many things, but ending an insurgency
is not one of them. Lyall and Wilson have studied the effects of mechanization
in warfare from 1800 until 2005, specifically looking at insurgencies.[13]
They discovered that as militaries mechanized (starting around WWI), they
became less and less effective against insurgent tactics. This they theorize is
because of the lack of connection with the population the insurgency is hiding
amongst: armored troops spend less time in a population center, don’t make as
many personal connections with the people living there, and generally don’t
acquire the deep local knowledge needed to discriminate between insurgent and
civilian.
If armored troops have a difficult time determining who
targets are, a drone circling overhead at 10,000 feet, with literally zero contact
with civilians, will have an even harder time. In addition, the lack of contact
makes any sort of hearts and minds campaign impossible: drones don’t do
anything directly positive for civilians on the ground like soldiers can. Lyall
and Wilson do not make the claim that mechanized forces will always lose a
conflict with insurgents, but they will be less effective at winning than a
more “primitive” infantry based army[14].
Taken all together, it seems that drone strategies are
excellent for maintaining the status quo. Their low initial cost, and the
difficulty of increasing costs on the drone user, makes it difficult to feel a
drone war is too expensive to continue fighting, thus making it extremely
difficult for a strong state to “lose” with a drone strategy. However, their
inability to control the ground or pacify an area makes it equally difficult to
“win”. As an airpower only strategy, modern drones will not be effective at
coercing the enemy to give up the fight, but are effective at destroying enemy forces
if they assemble in sufficient force. This forces the enemy to hide, enacting
only small guerilla attacks that, like airpower, are unable to win a war. A
drones vs. insurgent campaign should, in theory, end up in a war of low level
attrition, with neither side able to take and hold enemy territory or inflict
major costs on the other unless they make a mistake, such as the strong state
putting soldiers in harms way, or the insurgents massing to conquer a piece of
territory and getting chopped to pieces by airpower.[15]
If a war can continue stalemated forever, the winner is
whatever side is protecting the status quo. A government could suppress, but
not defeat a rebel group with drones. However, the government, being in power
currently, might be willing to accept this outcome. Stall for time, wait until
the rebels fall apart on their own or the political situation changes. In
Afghanistan, the US could, for example, likely suppress the Taliban with a
drone campaign, but could not defeat them. With sufficient time however, the
Afghan central government might be able to gain effectiveness and legitimacy,
making it far more difficult for the rebels to achieve an overthrow of the
government. The central government could eventually use ground forces and
police to actually win the insurgency, defending the border, protecting
civilians, and rooting out insurgents in the population. This is unlikely to
happen any time soon of course, but buying time is exactly what a drone
campaign can be expected to do.
Drone effectiveness in the field can be measured by looking
at the number of drone missions, the type of mission and comparing them to
levels of direct insurgent action.[16]
Drones, acting as theater air power, should be able to stop enemy forces from
assembling in strength. Drone strikes might not prevent all guerilla-style
attacks, but they should result in significant decreases in attempts to take or
control territory. However, if drones are being used in strategic bombing
roles, either to decapitate leaders or deny resources to forward troops, there
should be little measurable decrease (all other things being equal) in
insurgent activity either in guerilla attacks or direct military action.
The large-n study can be supplemented with careful case
studies of specific theaters where drones are used as theater air power or in a
strategic sense. Interviews with military officers, examining mission reports,
and looking at the percentage of drone kills that are civilians (collateral
damage through a decapitation or other strategic mission) will allow for a deep
sense of what drones can and cannot do, thus informing military strategists and
policymakers alike.
[1] Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. 2001. “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory
of Asymmetric Conflict.” International Security 26 (1): 93–128.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Sullivan, Patricia L. 2007. “War Aims and War Outcomes Why
Powerful States Lose Limited Wars.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51
(3): 496–524.
[5] Ibid.
[6] “One Soldier, One Year: $850,000 and Rising – CNN Security
Clearance - CNN.com Blogs.” 2014. Accessed February 14.
http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/28/one-soldier-one-year-850000-and-rising/.
[7] US Navy. 2012. “Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2013
President’s Budget Submission.” Navy Justification Book Volume 1 Aircraft
Procurement, Navy Budget Activities 1-4.
[8] “What Would a Strike against Syria Cost?- MSN Money.” 2014.
Accessed February 14.
http://money.msn.com/now/post--what-would-a-strike-against-syria-cost.
[9] US Air Force. 2012. “Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY)
2013 President’s Budget Submission.” Air Force Justification Book Volume 1
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force.
[10] For an
extensive review of strategic bombing, see Pape,
Robert Anthony. 1996. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War.
Cornell University Press.
[11] Pape, Robert A. 1990. “Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam
War.” International Security: 103–46.
[12] Pape, Robert A. 1997. “The Limits of Precision‐guided Air Power.” Security Studies 7 (2): 93–114.
[13] Lyall, Jason, and Isaiah Wilson. 2009. “Rage against the
Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars.” International
Organization 63 (1): 67–106.
[14] Ibid.
[15] For an example
of this during Vietnam see Pape, 1990
[16] Wikileaks data
could be used for this.
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